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This research presents a dynamic model of crime in which agents anticipate future consequences
of their actions.  Current period decisions affect future outcomes by a process of capital accumulation.
While investigating the role of human capital, the focus of our study is on a form of capital that has
received somewhat less attention in the literature, social capital.  Social capital is an index of one's
'stock' in society.  Introduction of social capital into the utility function results in an intertemporally
nonseparable preference structure which admits state dependence in the decision to participate in crime.
Our model is empirically implemented using panel data on a sample from the 1958 Philadelphia Birth
Cohort Study.  In estimation, we take account of unobserved choices in states not realized, which
potentially depend on individual specific heterogeneity, by using simulation techniques.  Our results
provide evidence of state dependence in the decision to participate in crime.  We also find that the initial
level of social capital stock is important in determining the pattern of criminal involvement in adulthood.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Criminal choice has traditionally been studied in economics using a static time allocation model,
imposing myopic rationality
i.  However, the empirical relationship referred to as the age-crime profile
(Quetelet (1984,[1831]), Hirschi and Gottfredson (1983), Wolfgang, Thornberry and Figlio (1987),
Leung (1994)) shows aggregate arrests to be a unimodal positively skewed function of age across
different time periods and countries.  This empirical phenomenon, along with ethnographic evidence
from the criminology literature (Sampson and Laub , 1993), suggests that life-cycle factors are
important in explaining criminal choice.  To explore this issue, we present a dynamic model of crime in
which agents anticipate future consequences of their actions.  Further, we adopt an intertemporally
nonseparable preference structure which is consistent with the existence of state dependence in the
decision to participate in crime.
In developing an intertemporal model of crime, we draw on literature from labor supply
(Heckman, 1981; Kydland and Prescott, 1982; Johnson and Pencavel, 1984; Nakamura and Nakamura,
1985; Hotz, Kydland and Sedlacek, 1988), health (Grossman, 1972; Muurinen; 1982; Wolpin, 1984;
Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1988; Sickles and Yazbeck, 1998) and rational addictions (Becker and
Murphy, 1988; Becker, Grossman and Murphy, 1994), which allows state dependence to operate
through the individual's preference structure and earnings.
ii  In these models, a capital stock is
introduced into the utility function so that optimal current period decisions take into account their affect
on future utility through the capital accumulation process
iii.  Current decisions also impact future
welfare through the effect of the capital stock on life-cycle wages.  Our intertemporal model of crime
assumes that an individual's preferences and earnings depend upon his stock of social capital
iv, where
social capital is defined as an index of one's 'stock' in society.
We assume that an agent's stock of social capital depends on inherited social position as well as
past decisions.  Inherited social position is modelled as a function of characteristics of the family and
childhood associations and behavior.  In adulthood gross investment in social capital is assumed to be
generated by engaging in legitimate activities which develop institutional relationships, such as
attachment to the workforce and marriage.  Unlike work, criminal activity is not sanctioned by society.
In the event of arrest, an individual's social capital stock is reduced through a social sanction, which may
entail marriage breakdown or loss of one's job or reputation.  As an investment good, social capital
enters directly into the individual's preference function representing the utility value of reputation, and
the earnings function representing the monetary value of networks and institutional knowledge
components of social capital.v
The importance of the interaction between individuals and their community in forming tastes and
determining criminal choices has been studied by Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996; Akerlof
and Yellen, 1994; and Sah, 1991.  A common theme in these papers is that the stigma or community
norms associated with crime influences individual behavior.  Our study goes further by recognizing that
the ability of society to stigmatize an individual depends upon that individual's stock in society. In our
model, we assume that the social sanction depends positively on both the seriousness of the crime and
the level of social capital stock the individual has accumulated.  This formulation is consistent with the
central hypothesis of social control theory: crime is more costly, and therefore less likely for individuals
with a greater stock in their community.
The intuition behind our model is that attachment to society through, for example, productive
employment and marriage, creates a form of state dependence which reduces the likelihood of criminal
involvement.  In our formulation, this effect is reinforced since state dependence imposes higher
potential costs of engaging in crime: individuals who have good jobs or families have more to loose if
caught committing crimes than those without such attachments.  Our approach is also consistent with a
model of criminal activity that conceives of legitimate time uses and social associations (e.g.,
participation in church activities, white collar employment) as shaping preferences concerning illegal
activities
v.  In this sense, social capital is an index of an individual's propensity for noncriminal behavior.
Previous studies of crime have paid particular attention to the role of human capital.  This
literature views criminal activity as similar to employment in that it requires time and produces income
(Ehrlich, 1973)
vi.  Individual’s who face a lower wage, having accumulated a smaller stock of human
capital, incur a lower opportunity cost of engaging in crime in terms of forgone earnings and are
therefore more likely to participate in crime.  However, greater human capital accumulation may be the
result of investment in social capital from within the family during childhood.  Keane and Wolpin
(1997), find evidence consistent with this.  Using a sample from the 1979 NLSY, they show that
educational and occupational choice over the life-cycle are largely determined by investment inputs
received before the age of sixteen years.  Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) demonstrate that quality of
parental inputs is also important in the accumulation of human capital of children.  Their study indicates
that while maternal schooling attainment has no impact on measured ability, it has a positive influence
on children’s achievement
vii.  Clearly social and human capital are not incompatible explanations of
individual behavior and are potentially complementary explanations of crime.  Nonetheless, a growing
number of studies using individual level data have failed to find a significant negative relationship
between criminality and labor market earnings or wages
viii, casting doubt on the crime as work model.vi
They do find, however, evidence that interaction between individuals and their community, working
through peer influences, attitudes to crime, information (about criminal or legitimate opportunities),
influence the decision to participate in crime.  We draw on this evidence as a basis for our focus on
social capital in our theoretical model, while considering both human and social capital effects in our
empirical specification.
We empirically implement our model of individual choice using data from the 1958 Philadelphia
Birth Cohort Study (Figlio, Tracy, and Wolfgang, 1991).  This data presents a unique opportunity to
study the dynamic decision to participate in crime.  Data used to study crime at the individual level are
generally drawn from high risk populations, such as prison releasees, and consequently suffer from
problems arising from selection bias.  The 1958 Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study has a universe of all
individuals born in 1958 who lived in Philadelphia at least from their tenth until their eighteenth
birthday.  Since all individuals in the sample are the same age and lived in the same city during their
adolescent years, this data set is especially suited to studying dynamic elements of individuals'
preferences.
Estimation of the Euler equations implied by our structural model of crime is made problematic
by an omitted regressor problem.  The issue arises because decisions are made under uncertainly and
individuals do not know if they will be arrested.  The ex-ante optimality conditions depend on (state
contingent) choices in each of two possible future states, apprehension and escaping apprehension.
However, only one of these future states will be realized and the corresponding choice observed in the
data.  The unobserved choices in states not realized cause an omitted regressor problem in estimation,
and are a potential source of unobserved heterogeneity.  We address these issues using simulation
techniques and estimate the parameters of our model by Method of Simulated Moments (McFadden,
1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989; McFadden and Ruud, 1994).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we present a life-cycle
model of crime which merges the intertemporal choice literature with Ehrlich's atemporal time allocation
model of crime.  Section 3 provides a description of the 1958 Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study and a
discussion of the construction of our index of social capital stock.  Section 4 provides a preliminary
examination of our data.  In Section 5 we discuss the method for estimating the structural parameters of
the model and presents the results from estimation.  In section 6, we offer some concluding remarks.
2. THE MODEL
The basic premise of the economic model of crime is that people, including criminals, behave
rationally.  Specifically, they act in a way calculated to maximize their economic welfare.  This idea hailsvii
back to Bentham (1970 [1789]) and Beccaria (1963 [1764]), and has more recently been formalized by
Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973).  In this framework, a person commits an offense if the expected
utility to him exceeds the utility obtained by using his time and other resources in alternative activities.
Therefore, according to the rational choice perspective, some people choose to engage in crime while
others choose not to because their benefits and costs - not their basic motivations - are different
(Becker,1968).
A somewhat similar approach is found in the criminology literature.  According to social control
theory, it is potential costs and benefits associated with crime that distinguishes criminals from
noncriminals.  Social control theory assumes that everyone is motivated to commit crime, but most are
kept from doing so by the potential cost of social sanctions.  It is the bonds an individual has to
conventional social groups that generate the potential cost of social sanctions, and this in turn restrains
misbehavior.  A derivative of social control theory is informal social control theory, which emphasizes
the influence of institutional relationships such as family, work, and community on the likelihood of
deviance
ix.  Laub and Sampson (1993) link informal social control with the notion of social capital.
Social capital measures the degree to which an individual is bonded to society, and as with any other
kind of capital, it is cumulative.
In the theoretical model of crime that follows, an individual’s welfare is assumed to depend upon
his level of social capital stock, representing his ‘stock’ in society
x.  In our formulation, social capital is
hypothesized to influence individual’s behavior in two ways.  First, through preferences; in part, social
capital represents reputation and social acceptance.  This has utility value to the individual.  Second,
social capital affects labor market earnings.  Social capital includes the networks that are built up at
work and in the community through labor market experience. For instance, these networks serve to
disseminate information about opportunities for advancement in the legitimate sector
xi.  We captured
this effect by allowing the accumulation of social capital to raise market earnings.
In breaking the law, an agent risks a reduction in his social capital stock since an arrest entails a
social sanction
1.  The sanction is assumed to be increasing in social capital so that, ceteris paribus, crime
is more costly (and therefore less likely) for those who have a greater stock in their community.
Whether a social sanction is to be imposed is uncertain; it depends on whether the individual is
apprehended.  We build uncertainty into the model by making use of a common generalization about the
                                               
nalt 
1  Social sanction may include job termination, or marriage breakdown.  Unlike the traditional time allocation
model of crime, we do not consider the monetary equivalent of the punishment.  This omission is a result of data
limitations.  The Philadelphia Cohort Study contains arrest data, but no information on convictions or
punishments.viii
nature of crime.  Crime is characterized as providing immediate rewards, while punishment is seen as
uncertain and in the distant future.  This stylized fact is incorporated into our model by temporally
separating the commission of crime from the incidence of the expected punishment.  Crimes committed
in the current period will be punished next period with probability, p. 
xii
At the beginning of each period, the representative agent must decide on his level of
consumption, Xt, and the amount of time to allocate to work, Lt, to crime which produces income
xiii, Ct,
and leisure, l t , where time represents resources devoted to each activity
xiv.  The utility of an individual
at any point in time depends on consumption of the composite market good, Xt, the level of leisure, l t ,
and the stock of social capital, St.  At time t, utility is given by:
( ) U X S t t t , , l . (2.1)
The utility function, U(.) is twice differentiable, concave, and increasing in its arguments.  Denoting
earnings within a period in terms of the composite good, Xt, the intertemporal budget constraint is given
by:
( )( ) A r A W L S W C X t t L t t C t t + = + + + - 1 1 ( , ) ( ) (2.2)
where WL(Lt,St)
xv is income from legitimate activity, WC(Ct)
xvi is income from illegitimate activity, and
At represents the value of accumulated assets.  We assume that income from legitimate and illegitimate
activities are increasing in their respective arguments
xvii.  Note that pecuniary rewards from income
producing crime are certain since, by assumption, they depend only on the amount of resources devoted
to this activity
xviii.  Income from legitimate endeavors depends on both current period resources devoted
to its pursuit and the level of social capital accumulated by the individual.  Since the state of the world -
apprehended for last period's crime, or escaped apprehension for last period's crime - and therefore the
individual's level of social capital, is revealed at the beginning of each period, legitimate income in the
current period is also certain.  However, future earnings in the legitimate sector depend on future levels
of social capital, which are uncertain.  Uncertainty about future welfare is also introduced via the direct
utility effect of social capital.
Social capital is cumulative and, following the approach of Becker and Murphy (1988),
investment is considered as proportional to the level of effort and other resources spent in legitimate
activity.  Resources in this model are represented by time.  Social capital also depends on the state of
the world.  In the event of not being apprehended (State 0) for crimes committed in time t, which occurs
with probability (1-p), social capital at  t+1 is given by:ix
S S L t t t + = - + 1
0 1 ( ) d g (2.3)
where d is the depreciation rate of social capital and g transforms resources spent in legitimate activity
into social capital
xix.With probability, p, the individual will be apprehended (State 1) at the beginning of
t+1 and a social sanction imposed.  This sanction is represented by a loss to the individual's social
capital stock.  The loss will depend positively on the total amount of time devoted to crime and the level
of social capital stock the individual has accumulated. Thus, in the event of apprehension, social capital
at the beginning of  t+1 is given by:
{ } S C S t t t + = - - 1
1 1 ( ) d a (2.4)
where a represents the technology that transforms resources spent in crime into a social sanction.
A representative individual's dynamic programming problem is characterized by his value
function at period t, V(A t , St ), which is the solution to the Bellman equation:
( ) ( ) ( ) { } V A S U X S pV A S p V A S t t
Xt Lt Ct
t t t t t t t ( , ) max , , , ( ) ,
, ,




Subject to 2.2, 2.3 2.4 and a time constraint  T L C t t t = + + l .  By substituting the time constraint in for
l t , we eliminate it as a choice variable.  Taking first order conditions and making use of the Envelope
Theorem, we obtain the following set of Euler equations
xx:
{ } X U t r pU t p U t t: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1
1
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The usual condition for optimality in consumption is given by the Euler equation for the
aggregate consumption good, with the ratio of the marginal utility of current period consumption to the
expected marginal utility of next period’s consumption is equated to the gross real rate of interest.  The
Euler equation for time spent in the labor market equates net current period costs associated with time
at work to the expected value of the increase in social capital in terms of next period decision variables.
Similarly, the Euler equation for time spent in illegitimate income generating activities equates the net
marginal benefit this period to the expected future cost.  Once functional forms are specified for the
utility and earnings functions, the system of three Euler equations and two earnings equations give a
closed form solution for the optimal allocation of resources.
3. DATA
3.1  Description of the 1958 Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study
We empirically implement our model using data from the 1958 Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study
(Figlio, Tracy, and Wolfgang, 1991), which has a universe of all individuals born in 1958 who lived in
Philadelphia at least from their tenth until their eighteenth birthday.  The investigators of this cohort
study used public and parochial school records to identify the 27,160 subjects who met the criteria for
inclusion in the study.  Juvenile
xxi and adult
xxii arrest records up to age 26 were collected for all cohort
members. Rap sheet
xxiii and police investigation reports provided by the Juvenile Aid Division of the
Philadelphia Police Department were used to characterize all police encounters experienced by the
cohort before age eighteen.  The adult criminal justice data come from the Municipal and Common
Pleas Courts of Philadelphia.  These data include rap sheet information on every offense committed in
Philadelphia by cohort members who were eighteen years of age or older up until December 31, 1984.
Our primary data are from a stratified
xxiv random sample of the cohort, who were administered a
retrospective survey in 1988.  Only males were used in this research
xxv. A 38 percent success rate in
locating and interviewing males selected for the retrospective follow-up survey produced a sample size
of 577.  Importantly for our analysis, the follow-up survey contains self-report data on criminal and
labor market activity
xxvi.  We use the self-report data on criminal activity covering ages nineteen to
twenty-four, corresponding to the six year sample 1977 to 1982.  Further description of these data is
found in Figlio, M., Tracy, P. E., and Wolfgang, M. E., Delinquency in A Birth Cohort II: Philadelphia
1958-1986 (1991).
Detailed information on an individual’s employment history was used to construct annual
observations on the number of hours worked per year and annual labor income.  We used the self-report
data and official records on criminal activity covering ages nineteen to twenty-four, corresponding toxi
the six year sample 1977 to 1982 to construct a crime seriousness score, adopting the method described
by Wolfgang and Sellin (1964). Individuals with extensive missing data on employment history and
wage variables were excluded from our analysis.  Our final data set contains observations on 423
individuals over the ages of 19-24 corresponding to the  period 1977 to 1982.  A definition of variables
and summary statistics in Table 1.  A description of the method used to construct labor market and
crime variables is contained in appendix 2.
As can be seen from Table 1, the stratification on which random sampling from the cohort was
based has lead to our sample containing individuals of whom 56% are white
xxvii, and 54% come from
high socioeconomic status families.  The majority of these young men reported that their father lived
with them while they were growing up (82%), and their father was not arrested during their childhood
(89%).  Almost a third of our sample were in a gang before the age of eighteen.  As for educational
attainment, 34% left school without a high school diploma, 60% achieved at least a high school
diploma, but did not complete college.  Only 6% of these young men completed a college degree.
In terms of criminal behavior, thirty-nine percent of the individuals in our sample had neither a
juvenile nor adult arrest record. Twenty-five percent had a juvenile record but no arrest as an adult.
Eleven percent had no juvenile record but at least one arrest as an adult.  Twenty-five percent were
arrested both as an adult and as a juvenile.
xxviii  Thirty-six percent of the sample had been arrested at
least once as adults before 31 December 1984.  Of the adult offenders, 48% had a single arrest, 13.5%
had 2 arrests, while 38.5% had greater than 2 arrests, with the maximum number of arrests being 13 and
was achieved by 1 individual.
3.2 MEASURING SOCIAL CAPITAL
3.2.1  Inherited Social Capital Stock.
A common theme in social interaction models is that stigma or community norms influence
individual behavior, with current as well as inherited social positions determining the extent of influence.
To model this idea, we construct an index of social capital stock accounting for both inherited and
current social position of our sample.  We adopt the use of an index since the attributes that contribute
to social capital can reasonably be thought to affect an individual’s welfare, but cannot reasonably be
considered objective arguments of an individual’s utility function.  We assume that the initial level of
social capital stock is inherited, since cohort members are eighteen on entering our sample.
It is the institution of family that creates inherited social capital.  Family social capital is the
vehicle by which intergenerational transmission of norms, values, family reputation, connections and
goals take place
xxix.  Social capital inherited from the family depends on the physical presence of thexii
parents and on the attention given to the child by the parents.  Even if both parents are physically
present, a diminished level of inherited social capital can result from the child's attachment to a youth
community, such as a gang, or from a dilution of adult attention to the child due to the presence of
siblings (Coleman, 1988).
There is much evidence that family structure is an important determinant of criminality.  In their
extensive review of the literature on participation in crime, Visher and Roth (1986) find that people
who lived with one natural parent as children have a higher participation rate in crime than those who
lived with both parents.  Family break-ups during childhood increase participation in crime as adults,
with divorce and separation having a stronger adverse effect than death.  Also, families with large
numbers of children contribute a disproportionately large number of criminals.  The studies reviewed by
Visher and Roth (1986) show a strong empirical relationship between criminal participation by parents
and their offspring.  Other factors associated with participation in crime include involvement with
negative peers around the age of fourteen and drug use.  We use this empirical literature, in addition to
social control theory, to guide us in identifying factors in our data likely to contribute to inherited social
capital.
Obtaining a set of weights for aggregating variables such as presence of father, and gang
affiliation during childhood raises the classic index number problem.  Maasoumi (1986, 1990, 1993)
develops a framework for constructing composite indices for multidimensional measures using
information theory.  Following Maasoumi, suppose we have individual level data on N individuals over
M attributes, Y=[yij] i=1,…,N , j=1,….,M and we wish to find an aggregate index Si such that S=(S1,
S2, …SN) is ‘closest’ to all M attributes.  Viewing  ( ) Y Y Y i i iM =
¢
1,......... as a multivariate random
variable, we then require the index Si to have a distribution as close as possible to that of Yi .  Using
generalized entropy (GE) as a measure of distance between distributions, Maasoumi  shows that
choosing S in order to  minimize
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* is ideal in that it introduces the least amount of distortion in, or divergence from, the
distributional information of the Yi’s.  For example, the ‘linear aggregate’ function S y i j
j
ij = d ￿ will bexiii
the ideal index if g = -1.  If we had data on commodities rather than attributes, and used prices for d j ,
the ideal index would in fact be expenditure.
The expenditure example highlights a major empirical difficulty in constructing indicies where
market prices for attributes, such as presence of father, do not exist.  What should be used as weights in
constructing the index?  Maasoumi  suggests the use of the (normalized) first principal component from
the Y matrix for the weights  d j .  The use of principal components in the economics literature to
summarize attributes into a composite index was proposed by Ram (1982).  Maasoumi shows that
principal components can be interpreted as a special case of the ideal index when g=-1 and the dj are the
(normalized) elements of the first characteristic vector of the covariance matrix of  yij
xxx.  In our
application, we follow Maasoumi (1986, 1990, 1993) and Ram (1982), summarizing the information
from our data on inherited social capital in a composite index using the linear aggregate function
S y i j ij
j
=￿d  with the dj arrived at through principal components
xxxi.
Table 2 lists the variables used in the construction of the initial level of social capital and the
corresponding (normalized) weights arising from principal component analysis.  The signs on the
weights are consistent with social capital theory and the empirical literature surveyed by Visher and
Roth (1986).  Coming from a white two-parent household with a high socioeconomic status and having
a father with no arrests (during the individual's childhood) increases the social stock accumulated during
childhood.  Our results indicate that not being involved in a (deviant) youth culture, such as a gang, and
having friends who were not in trouble with the police facilitates social capital accumulation.  We find
support for the hypotheses that siblings dilute parental attention, which negatively affects the
transmission of social capital from parents to child.  We also find that involvement in criminal activity in
youth, as measured by juvenile arrests, reduces the stock in society accumulated during this period.  The
index of inherited social capital is constructed as a weighted sum of these variables.
3.2.2  Current Social Capital Stock
According to informal social control theory, for adults gross investment in social capital is
generated though engagement in legitimate activities.  These activities develop institutional relationships
such as attachment to the workforce and marriage.  While providing detailed information on
employment history, the 1958 Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study data do not provide information on the
level of involvement individuals have in their community.  However, it does contain information about
what Sampson and Laub (1993) would consider turning points, such as marriage and beginning a new
job.  While much of the criminology literature has emphasized stability and continuity, Sampson andxiv
Laub (1993) argue that transitions, which are specific life events, are also important in understanding an
individuals criminality, as these events may modify long term patterns of behavior.  For example, getting
married forms social capital through a process of the reciprocal investment between husbands and
wives.  This investment creates an interdependent system of obligation and restraint and increases an
individual's bonds to society.  Also, young males tend to have high job turnover rates.  Assuming that
leaving a job and starting a new one in the same period is attributable to upward employment mobility,
a new job increases attachment to the legitimate sector when the employer's act of investing in the
individual is reciprocated.  Additionally, a better job increases an individual’s system of networks.
These forces act together to increase his ties to the legitimate community and thus increase his social
capital.
In our empirical specification we follow the informal social control approach of Sampson and
Laub (1993), allowing the life-course turning points of getting married (BEMt) and leaving and
beginning a new job in the same period (CHANGJt) to build stock in society (St).  We account for
stability of labor market attachment in our measure of social capital through time spent in the legitimate
labor market (LABHRSt).  Social capital also depends on the state of the world, which is learnt at the
beginning of each period.  In the event of not being apprehended (State 0) for crimes committed in time
t (Ct), social capital at t+1 is given by:
S S LABHRS BEGM CHANG J t t t t t + = - + + + 1
0
1 2 3 1 ( ) d g g g (3.1)
where d is the depreciation rate of social capital and the g’s transforms resources spent in legitimate
activity into social capital.
Unlike legitimate income earning activities, criminal activity is not sanctioned by society, and
this is modelled as a loss to the individual's social capital stock.  The loss is assumed to depend
positively on the resources devoted to crime ( Ct) and the level of social capital stock the individual has
accumulated (St).  This formulation captures the central hypothesis of informal social control theory:
ceterus parabus deviant acts are less likely for individuals tightly bonded to their community.  An
alternative way to express this idea is that the expected cost of crime is greater for those with more
social capital stock.  Our formulation also captures the idea that the more serious the crime, the larger
the penalty since the penalty is proportional to the seriousness of the crime.  Thus, in the event of
apprehension, (State 1) social capital at the beginning of  t+1 is given by:
{ } S C S t t t + = - - 1
1 1 ( ) d a (3.2)
where a represents the technology that transforms resources spent in crime into a social sanction.xv
We construct the social capital index for the sample period according to the stock accumulation
equations 3.1 and 3.2.  An initial set of attribute weights for each of our stock accumulation equations is
obtained by partitioning the first period data into arrest observations and non-arrest observations.
Principal component analysis is then performed on the appropriate variables for each of these data sets.
Note that the first period data includes the inherited social capital stock.  The initial weights are used to
construct the next period’s social capital stock, S2.  The weights are then updated by partitioning period
1 and 2’s data into arrest and non-arrest observations and performing principal components on the two
data sets.  This process is repeated until a full set of observations on social capital is obtained.  To filter
out the variation in weights arising from this iterative procedure, we perform the following regression to
obtain our final set of weights.
, ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
3
2 1 1
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
u I S C I CHANGJ
I BEGM I LABHRS S k S
+ - - +
- + - + - + = +
a g
g g d
where It is an indicator equal to 1 if the individual is arrested in period t, and 0 otherwise.  The resulting
weights are shown in Table 3.  These are used to construct our series of social capital stock.
These results imply a rate of depreciation on social capital of 3% a year.  If apprehended, and
assuming the average index value for resources devoted to crime (for those arrested) of 129, the penalty
is a further loss of 3% of social capital.  Time spent in employment, getting married, and changing jobs
all have a positive impact on creating stock in society, as expected, while being arrested incurs a
penalty, as indicated by the negative coefficient on the interaction between the crime seriousness score
and social capital stock.
In the following sections, we use our social capital index to account for investment from the
family and the importance of social networks in criminal and legitimate decision making.  Before
presenting our formal analysis, we provide descriptive evidence of the influence both of social
interactions and human capital in decisions regarding work and crime.
4. EMPLOYMENT, EARNINGS, FAMILY AND CRIME.
Both the basic human capital and social capital models provide a number of qualitative
implications that can be assessed with simple descriptive statistics.  In particular, the human capital
model predicts that wages increase in the level of human capital accumulated, and therefore individuals
with more human capital are more likely to work
xxxii.  As a corollary, the human capital approach to
crime predicts that those engaging in crime must have a lower opportunity cost of employment (since
crime takes time) and hence face a lower market wage than non-criminals.  According to the social
capital perspective, social bonds as measured by social capital stock increase the expected cost of crimexvi
making criminal acts less likely.  This stock is accumulated during adulthood through institutional
relationships such as marriage and employment.  Consequently, we would expect employed people to be
less likely to engage in crime. Prior to adulthood, the institution of the family is the vehicle for social
capital accumulation.  Therefore, family background variables that influence the inherited level of social
capital are likely to affect criminality in adulthood.  At this point, it is worth reiterating that the social
and human capital are likely to have complementary effects in individual decision making, and are not
incompatible.
Table 4 considers the average hourly wage (in current dollars for people working) by education
and criminal status.  It shows support for the basic prediction of human capital theory, that earnings are
increasing in human capital stock, as measured by educational attainment.  There does not appear to be
such clear support for the crime as work explanation of participation in crime, with criminals and non-
criminals reporting similar hourly wages.
Table 5 shows that those who have accumulated a larger human capital stock are more likely to
be employed as predicted by the human capital model.  (Recall that college graduates are about twenty
two years of age and these men turn twenty two in 1980).  With respect to the comparison between
criminals and non-criminals, we find that criminals are less attached to the labor market despite facing
similar labor market wages as non-criminals.  While explaining the relationship between education and
earnings, these data do not provide clear evidence in support of the crime as work model of
participation in crime for members of this sample.  However, under the social capital perspective,
institutional relationships such as employment increase an individual’s stock in society, increasing the
expected costs of criminal acts.  Therefore we would expect criminals to be less attached to
employment, as reflected in Table 5.
We further explore the social capital perspective by considering variables that are indicative of
the social capital stock individuals accumulate throughout childhood from parental investment.  A low
endowment of social capital inherited from childhood is likely to result in less attachment to society and
a greater risk of criminality in adulthood.  Table 6 considers attachment to society, as reflected by
employment rates, by three key factors determining the potential for social capital accumulation in
childhood.  Members of our sample who had a father living with them while they were growing up are
much more likely to be employed during the sample period than those who did not have their father in
their household during childhood.  Similarly, being a gang member in youth indicates that even with
both parents present the child’s absorption in a deviant youth culture diminishes the investment inherited
by the child.  This is reflected in less attachment to the workforce for sample members who were inxvii
youth gangs compared to those who were not.  Lastly, Table 6 also shows that there is a negative
association between criminal participation by parents and labor force participation of their offspring.
Table 7 considers the same factors with respect to participation in crime, as measured by arrests.
The arrest participation rate is defined as the number of individuals arrested divided by the relevant
population.  These tabulations are consistent with the prediction that social capital inherited from
childhood influences not only labor market outcomes, but also criminal outcomes.  Individuals who did
not grow up with a father in their household, were members of a gang, or whose father was arrested
during their childhood are more likely to be arrested in adulthood than their sample counterparts over
the period observed.
In the following section we provide a more formal investigation of the role of human and social
capital in decisions regarding work and crime.  As already noted, human and social capital effects are
not incompatible and may be complementary. For example, while the crime as work model relies on
poor labor market earnings to explain participation in crime, the social capital model allows for variables
reflecting social influences to effect participation in crime.
5. EMPIRICAL MODEL
The structural model developed in Section 2 characterizes the behavior of a representative
individual by a system of five equations.  Three of these are Euler equations, which depend on future
choices under two states of nature, apprehension, and escaping apprehension.  Since only one future
state is realized for each individual, choices corresponding to the unobserved state cause an omitted
regressor problem in estimation.  The earnings equations do not depend on parameters from the utility
function, nor do they depend on decisions made in (potentially unobserved) future periods.  While it is
possible to estimate all five equations simultaneously, the absence of unobserved future states in the
earnings equations makes a sequential estimation process computationally convenient.  We begin by
estimating the parameters in the earnings equations.  The Euler equations are then estimated in a second
step using Method of Simulated Moments (McFadden and Ruud, 1994; McFadden, 1989; Pakes and
Pollard, 1989).
5.1  The Earnings Equations
5.1.1 Estimation Methodology for the Earnings Equations
The model presented in section 2 focuses on the role of social capital in decisions regarding
participation in crime and work.  This lead to a specification for earnings in crime which depends on
resources the individual allocates to that activity, and in the legitimate sector which depends on both
resources allocated and social capital stock
xxxiii.  However, in addition to the large empirical literaturexviii
on human capital, empirical research by Freeman (1996) suggests that the returns to legitimate
opportunities relative to crime also depends on human capital.  Further, he finds that human capital
affects relative income through raising returns to work.  To reflect this in our empirical model, we adopt
a more general specification which includes human capital as a determinant of legitimate earnings. The
following functional forms are assumed for earnings in the legitimate and illegitimate sectors
xxxiv
respectively:
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where  Lt and  Ct denote hours per year in legitimate and criminal income generating activities
respectively, St is the social capital stock accumulated by the individual at the beginning of period t, EDt
is a categorical variable equal to one if the highest level of education the individual attains is at least a
high school diploma and equal to zero otherwise, SCHt is a categorical variable equal to one if the
individual has not yet completed his education and zero otherwise ,and eLt and eCt are random error
terms.
We wish to use these equations to make statements regarding the determinants of income for the
entire sample of men.  However, hours worked in each sector are endogenous, and only a subsample of
the population are engaged in (either or both of) the income producing activities, so that the time
allocation variables, Lt and Ct, are censored from below at zero hours.  If the decision to work (in
legitimate or illegitimate activities) depends on unobservable characteristics which also influence
earnings, then the problem of sample selection exists.  Since we are estimating the earnings equations
separately from the Euler equations, we make use of standard econometric techniques to account for
the possibility of sample selection bias.
As actual hours worked (in either activity) are observed, we make use of this information by
adopting the methodology suggested in Vella (1996).  This approach is similar to the parametric two-
step approach of Heckman (1974,1979).  In the first step, we assume normality of the error term in the
latent variable reduced form equation for hours worked, leading to a Tobit specification.  However,
distributional assumptions about the error term in the earnings equation are relaxed in the second step.
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are the generalized residuals from the first step Tobit estimation and K is the number of terms in the
approximating series.  By including this polynomial in the earnings equation, we take account of the
selection term.   Therefore, exploiting the variation in hours worked (in either legitimate or illegitimatexix
income producing activities) for the subsample who participate provides consistent OLS estimates of
parameters in the (respective) earnings equation.  Provided K is treated as known, these estimates are
n  consistent and it is straightforward to compute the second step covariance matrix.
5.1.2   Earnings Equation Results
The earnings equations for criminal and legitimate activities are estimated using a fourth order
polynomial in the respective generalized Tobit residuals to approximate the correlation between the
error terms of the selection and earnings equations.  The results of this estimation are given below in
Table 8.
The parameter estimates for earnings in legitimate labor market activities are consistent with the
standard predictions of human capital theory.  Legitimate earnings are a concave function of time spent
in that activity.  The accumulation of human capital
xxxv (having at least a high school education) results
in an income profile with a lower starting income and a steeper slope.  In addition to the human capital
theory of earnings, we find evidence state dependence working through social capital.  As an investment
good, representing institutional knowledge and networks, social capital has a positive (and significant)
impact on earnings.  Assuming the mean level of social capital over the sample, the magnitude of this
affect is the same as that associated with achieving a high school degree or better.  This result supports
the hypothesis that market earnings exhibit state dependence in nondeviant behavior, as measured by the
social capital accumulation process, and that both human and social capital are significant determinants
of earnings.
[insert table 8 here]
Annual income from crime is found to be an increasing function of time spent in that activity.
Increasing returns to time in crime may be evidence of some fixed cost, or accumulation of crime
specific networks and knowledge.
One of the more salient features of the earnings equations results is that criminals and
noncriminals do not differ markedly in their earning ability in the legal sector, as seen in Table 9.
Contrary to the prediction of the traditional economic model of crime
xxxvi, it does not appear that lower
earning ability in legitimate activities leads to participation in crime.  Our result may be reflective of the
youth of our sample and the short period of labor market time observed after the completion of (higher)
education.  Nonetheless, this finding is consistent with a large body of empirical research that fails to
find a significant relationship between wages (or income) and criminal activity.
xxxvii
[insert table 5 here]xx
Another revealing feature of our results is that income from crime displays increasing returns while
income from legitimate work displays diminishing returns to time spent in the respective activity.  From
this characterization of earnings profiles we would expect individuals who participate in crime to
specialize.  However, eighty percent of men in our sample who engage in crime also work in the
legitimate sector.  Further, criminals only spend an average of one and one-half hours per week in crime
compared to almost 36 hours per week working at a legitimate job
xxxviii.  This implies there are costs
associated with crime, or benefits associated with not engaging in crime, that are not captured by the
earnings equations.  According to our model, these benefits are the utility value of social capital, such as
social acceptance and reputation, representing state dependence in nondeviant behavior in the
preference structure.  We investigate this hypothesis in the next section by estimating the Euler
equations associated with optimal allocation of time to criminal and legitimate activities, and
consumption.
5.2 The Euler Equations
5.2.1 Estimation Methodology for the Euler Equations
To begin, we assume that we have a panel of T periods of observations on a random sample of N
individuals and that all arguments of the Euler equations are observed without error.  Assume that the
earnings in the legal sector and crime are parameterized as above and that utility has the following
transcendental logarithmic form:
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To simplify exposition of our method for estimating the parameters of the Euler equations we introduce
the following notation.  Let Sit denote the value of the state variable, social capital stock, for the ith
individual in period  t, xit denote the vector of choice variables entering the ith individual’s Euler
equations in period t, and let xit+1 be those variables dated t+1.  Each of these Euler equations can be
written in the form of  ( ) ( ) f x S g x S j it it j it it , , , , q q 0 1 1 0 - + + , j=1,2,3, where f(.) is the observed response
function which depends on current period variables, and g(.) is the expected response function, which
depends on next periods variables, and  q0 is the px1 vector of parameters to be estimated.
xxxix  A
stochastic framework is introduced by assuming that variables determined outside the model, whose
future values are unknown and random, cause agents to make errors in choosing their utility maximizing
bundles.  These errors are idiosyncratic so that at any point in time, the expectation of this disturbancexxi
term over individuals is zero.  We also assume that these disturbances are independently distributed
over time and represent the ith individual’s system of equations as:
( ) ( ) f x S g x S u it it it it it , , , , q q 0 1 1 0 - = + + .
Suppose there exist conditional moment restrictions of the form,  [ ] E u z it it = 0 , where  zit  are
observed data.  These moment restrictions can be used to form a nonlinear instrumental variables
estimator of the preference parameters (Amemiya (1974), Jorgenson and Laffont (1974), and Gallant
(1977)).  Given panel data covering T years for each of the N individuals, the population orthogonality
conditions can be written as:
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Suppose then a law of large numbers can be applied to  M x S z i i i ( , , , ) q0  for all admissible q, so that the
sample average of  M x S z i i i ( , , , ) q0  converges to its population mean
[ ] [ ]
N i
N
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Hansen (1982) points out that the NLIV estimator of this form can be interpreted as the
Generalized Method of Moments estimator when the  uit  are serially uncorrelated and conditionally
homoskedastic.  Under the regularity conditions outlined in Hansen, (1982), the GMM estimator qmm, of
the unknown parameter vector  q0 minimizes the generalized quadratic distance from zero of the
empirical moments:
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xl.
In practice, implementing GMM as an estimator for the parameters in our system of Euler
equations is hampered by the fact that observed future welfare is state contingent: there are two possible
future states of the world - apprehension and escaping apprehension.  While agents' decisions are based
on ex-ante expectations of the future, ex-post, only one state is realized for each individual and
subsequently observed by the econometrician.  Since the (unobserved) choice in the state not realized
enters the Euler equations through  ( ) g x S it it + + 1 1 0 , ,q , we are faced with an omitted regressor problem inxxii
the expected response function.  We resolve this problem by replacing M(.) with a simulator, m(.).
McFadden (1989) proposes this simple modification of the conventional Method of Moments estimator
as the basis for the Method of Simulated Moments
xli.
To illustrate our use of MSM, suppose that we are have one Euler equation, and there is one
choice variable, xit.  Recall that individual  4 i’s current choice xit depends on the value of the state variable,
social capital stock, Sit.  Our problem is that xit+1 is not observed for individual i in the state not realized
in period t+1, so sample averages of M(.) cannot be formed.  However, if the density,  P( , ) x S  is
stationary, then we can replace the unobserved xit+1 with Monte-Carlo draws from the conditional
distribution, P( ) xS t+1
xlii.  Since this distribution is unknown, we draw from the empirical conditional
distribution, which is estimated by kernel-based methods.  Having replaced the unobserved data with the
Monte-Carlo draws, we then form a simulator of our moment conditions as follows:
( ) ( ) ( )
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Generalizing to three Euler equations and three unobserved choices, we use this framework to form a
simulator of the moment conditions and obtain an estimator for the preference parameters by minimizing
the weighted quadratic distance of the simulated moments from zero. Note that, although we motivate
our estimation methodology as a way of dealing with uncertainty about future states, our use of
simulation techniques that are conditioned on individual characteristics may also be viewed as a partial
control for unobserved individual heterogeneity about those states.
5.4  Euler Equation Results
The system of Euler equations derived in Section 2 is estimated using MSM on 423 individual’s
over the period 1977 to 1981.  The coefficient on the logarithm of social capital ( ) a3 is normalized at
unity, leaving eight coefficients to be estimated.  With three equations and eleven instruments, the
number of overidentifying restrictions is twenty-five.  The Hansen test statistic for overidentifying
restrictions is 5.23, compared to a c
2
0.95,25 =37.65, leading us to accept the null hypothesis that the
system is overidentified.  The MSM estimates of the preference parameters are presented in Table 10.
Seven of the eight coefficients are found to be statistically significant.  It is noteworthy that all three
terms involving social capital are found to be significantly different from zero, supporting the hypothesis
that preferences exhibit state dependence.xxiii
[insert table 6 here]
Examining the estimates of the translog preference parameters in Table 10, we find the coefficients on
the interaction terms between consumption and leisure (mult1ln ln Xt t l ), consumption and social
capital (ln ln X S t t ), and leisure and social capital (ln ln lt t S ) all are significant.  This indicates that
utility is not contemporaneously separable in any of its arguments.  Nonseparability between
consumption and leisure is an important finding as separability is often assumed.  Our estimates imply
that consumption and leisure are compliments in utility.  This is consistent with the work of Hotz,
Kydland and Sedlacek (1988), and Sickles and Yazbeck (1998)
xliii.  The relationships between
consumption and social capital, and leisure and social capital, are also found to be complementary.
Table 11 shows that our estimated marginal utility of consumption, leisure, and social capital are
positive for all time periods
xliv.  We find that the value of an incremental increase in the consumption
good rises over the life-course for our sample of young men.  In contrast, the marginal utility of leisure
declines steeply between the ages of nineteen and twenty, but remains fairly steady thereafter.  Based on
these estimates, the average marginal rate of substitution of is 0.0725, implying an hourly wage of $5.42
over the sample period
xlv.  The marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure we find in
studying youth is about an order of magnitude smaller than the value of 0.8667 obtained by Sickles and
Yazbeck who use data from the Retirement History Survey.  This may be evidence that individuals place
a higher value on leisure time as they draw closer to the end of their lives.
[insert table 11 here]
Table 11 also shows that the marginal utility of social capital increases over the life-cycle for our sample
of young men.  In addition to growing state dependence, this result indicates that agents are indeed
forward looking in their decision making.  Over the sample period, average leisure time decreases as
individuals spend a greater amount of time in employment.  Current labor market activity is expected to
increase future welfare through social capital accumulation process, and this in turn raises the marginal
utility of social capital in the current period.  Thus, the marginal utility of past investment in social
capital is increasing in current investment.  Alternately, the marginal utility of current investment in
social capital is increasing in past investment.  This is a necessary condition for adjacent
complementarity
xlvi.  Since past labor market participation raises social capital stock, which raises future
labor supply, we also find reinforcement in decision making.
To gauge the relative importance of consumption, leisure, and social capital in terms of utility
value, we consider the elasticity of utility with respect to each of these arguments.  This is presented in
Table 12.  These results indicate that utility is most sensitive to changes in social capital and leastxxiv
responsive to changes in consumption.  It is also interesting to note the temporal pattern in these
elasticities.  As these individuals age, their welfare becomes more responsive to changes in their level of
social capital and consumption, and less responsive to changes in their level of leisure.  This finding is
further support of growing state dependence in preferences.
[insert table 12 here]
Recall that our hypothesis is that institutional relationships such as marriage and a ‘good’ job strengthen
an individual’s stock in society.  This has the affect of increasing the cost of translating criminal
propensities into crime, thereby making the occurrence of crime less likely.  This life-cycle model of
behavior is consistent with the pattern of criminal behavior observed in the age-crime profile.  It is
particularly revealing to compare the temporal pattern of the age-crime profile of the cohort to which
our sample belongs, with the profile of marginal utility of social capital for the sample.  Figure 1 shows
a strong inverse relationship between the two profiles.  Our results provide evidence of growing state
dependence and reinforcement in nondeviant behavior, and hence increasing costs of deviant behavior,
during a period of decline in participation in crime.  We therefore conclude that our model provides a
possible explanation for the empirical phenomenon of age-crime profile.
[insert figure 1 here]
Our model performs well at explaining the decline in participation in crime for the average of our sample
and our results raise the question of whether differences in the degree to which individuals are ‘at risk’
determines criminal participation.  Our index of social capital allows us to investigate this issue, since it
provides a measure for unobserved deviant propensity.  In particular, family background and childhood
variables used in the construction of the initial level of social capital stock are commonly used as
indicators of whether an individual is at risk of criminality
xlvii.
Our investigation proceeds by partitioning the sample into quartiles on the basis of initial period
social capital stock and comparing the temporal pattern in the marginal utility of social capital for the
first and fourth quartiles.  These groups represent the most and least ‘at risk’ individuals respectively.
Figure 2 shows that the marginal utility of social capital for individuals in the fourth quartile (low risk
group) increases over time, just as it does for the whole sample.
[insert figure 2 here]
The marginal utility of social capital for individuals from the first quartile (high risk group) displays a
markedly different temporal pattern, as shown in Figure 3.  While the value of an incremental increase in
social capital increases over the ages 19 to 21, it falls thereafter.
[insert figure 3 here]xxv
Also, the marginal utility of social capital is always negative for this group.  The latter finding may be an
artifact of the assumed functional form for utility
tn .  Alternatively, it may be revealing something of a
more behavioral nature.
On comparing the two groups’ involvement with the criminal justice system, we find that
individuals from the first quartile are far more likely to be arrested for an income producing crime in any
year.  This is reported in Table 13.  These men appear to be embedded in a criminal culture by the age
of 18, when our study begins, and may consider  social capital to hinder their advancement in such a
culture.  This interpretation is consistent with a negative marginal utility associated with social capital.
While state dependence in crime appears to diminish over the age of 19 to 21, as indicated by marginal
utility of social capital becoming less negative, it strengthens thereafter.  This could be evidence of the
difficulty these individuals have breaking free from state dependence in criminal culture and successfully
building stock in legitimate society.
[insert table 13 here]
Our findings suggest that differences in the level of social capital inherited from the family may explain
why some individuals become career criminals, while others experience relatively short careers in crime.
In particular, failure of parents to pass on a critical level of stock in society may increase the likelihood
of children becoming career criminals in adulthood.
7.  CONCLUSION
In this paper we integrate the intertemporal choice and economics of crime literature to develop
a dynamic model of criminal choice.  Our model assumes that an individual’s preferences and earnings
are influenced by his stock of social capital.  Since agents anticipate the future consequences of their
actions through the capital accumulation process, rationality is forward looking.  Our model of rational
criminal choice predicts that people who are more attached to the labor force and have a cohesive
marriage develop a state dependence that reduces the likelihood of criminal involvement.  We measure
this state dependence using an index of social capital stock.  Further, we allow for differences arising
from observable family background to determine the initial value of this index.  While the focus of our
theoretical model is on social capital, we account for both human and social capital effects in our
empirical specification.
In estimating our structural model, complications arising from unobservables in the Euler
equations leads us to adopt a two part estimation procedure.  We estimate the earnings equations using
standard selection correction techniques and the Euler equations using the Method of Simulated
Moments.xxvi
Using data from the 1958 Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study, we find significant empirical support
for our dynamic model of crime.  The selectivity corrected earnings equation estimates for labor market
activities supports both human and social capital theories of earnings.  Consistent with the human
capital theory, we find that human capital raises labor market earnings.  We also find that earnings are
increasing in social capital stock.  This provides evidence of the monetary value of networks and
institutional knowledge that result from investment in one’s society.  Moreover, the magnitude of the
return to social capital is equal to the earnings premium associated with investment in education.
Application of a simulated method of moments estimator to our system of Euler equations
reveals significant state dependence in preferences, as measured by the stock of social capital.  We find
that the marginal utility of past investment in social capital is increasing in current investment, implying
adjacent complementarity.  This leads to growing state dependence over the life-course.  Growing state
dependence in nondeviant behavior raises the potential cost of engaging in crime, making its occurrence
less likely.  Therefore, we find that our model provides an explanation of the empirical relationship
between aggregate arrests and age.
We also investigate the performance of our model across individuals who differ in their degree
of being ‘at risk’ of becoming criminals.  Our index of social capital allows us to explore this issue since
it provides a measure of propensity for crime.  Our findings suggest that low levels of social capital
inherited from the family may explain why some individuals become career criminals, while individuals
who are more richly endowed experience relatively short careers in crime.  Also evident from our results
is the dynamic nature of the process of criminal choice.  The late teenage years to early twenties is a
crucial time for making the transition out of crime, even for those most disadvantaged in terms of
inherited social capital stock.
This last finding is of particular interest as it raises the issue of preventative policy for youth.
While the traditional economic model of crime provides a basis for formulating deterrence policy, it is
silent on preventative policy.  The debate over whether prison pays indicates that justifying the costs of
incarceration at current levels is questionable and that crime prevention policies for crime prone groups
are likely to be more attractive on a cost benefit basis (Freeman, 1996).  In order to contribute to the
policy discussion on preventative policy, however, economics must explore dynamic models of crime
that provide a mechanism for understanding the way in which preventative policy impacts individuals
potential criminal behavior.  Our results suggest that further development of social capital models of
crime to include human capital accumulation may prove to be a fruitful means for exploring this issue.xxvii
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Table 1
VARIABLE DEFINITION MEAN STANDARD
DEVIATION
Model Variables
L hours worked 1566.22 897.40
C Wolfgang-Sellin seriousness score 75.24 197.90
l leisure 4182.54 891.56
X real consumption 125.29 86.01
S social capital index 96.56 19.55
WL real annual labor income 102.56 19.55
WC real annual crime income 3.63 16.83
Determinants of Social Capital
SES Binary equal to 1 if socio-economic
status of family during childhood up is
high
0.54 0.50
WHITE Binary equal to 1 if race is white 0.56 0.50
DAD Binary equal to 1 if father present in
childhood home
0.82 0.39
NADAD Binary equal to 1 if father not arrested
during childhood
0.89 0.30
NGG Binary equal to 1 if not a gang member
during childhood
0.71 0.445
NSIBS10 Number of siblings (divided by ten) 0.327 0.217
PMNP Proportion of best 3 friends not picked
up by the police during high school
0.52 0.45
NPC number of police contacts as a juvenile 2.73 3.68
OFCONC proportion of police contacts as a
juvenile that were official contacts
0.54 0.45
ARCON proportion of contacts as a juvenile that
result in an arrest
0.35 0.39
BEGM Binary equal to 1 if begin a marriage
that year
0.05 0.23
CHANGJOB Binary equal to 1 if end and then begin
a job that year
0.10 0.30
ARREST Binary equal to 1 if arrested that year 0.10 0.30
IARREST Binary equal to 1 if arrested for a
property offense that year
0.063 0.24
Other Personal Characteristics
MARRY Binary equal to 1 if married 0.17 0.38
DEAFCTO Binary equal to 1 if in a common law
marriage
0.11 0.33
NUMKIDS number of children 1.30 1.35
NOMUM Binary equal to 1 if mother not present
in childhood home
0.02 0.15
MOVE Binary equal to 1 if moved out of
childhood home
0.07 0.26
ED Binary equal to 1 if gradated from high
school
0.66 0.47




Construction of the Initial Stock of Social Capital
cf1 Variable Weight
father present in childhood home  0.15
father not arrested during childhood  0.07
number of siblings -0.04
race is white  0.25
socioeconomic-economic status is high  0.29
not a gang member  0.28
proportion of best 3 friends from high school not picked up by the
police
 0.18
proportion of police contacts as a juvenile that result in arrest -0.18
Table 3






LABHRSt   0.08 0.0046
BEGMt   0.07 0.0036




Average Hourly Wage by Level of Education and Criminal Status








76 4.53 4.23 2.93 4.60 4.13
77 4.83 4.70 4.4 4.95 4.60
78 5.24 5.34 4.48 5.55 5.13
79 5.53 5.78 4.62 5.92 5.53
80 6.10 6.3 5.70 6.33 6.14
81 6.58 6.61 6.96 6.65 6.62
82 6.74 6.94 8.39 6.98 6.97
83 7.16 7.44 9.63 7.65 7.42
84 7.38 7.81 9.92 7.79 7.84xxxiii
Table 5
Employment Rate by Level of Education and Criminal Status








76 0.52 0.43 0.19 0.47 0.43
77 0.60 0.63 0.23 0.63 0.57
78 0.67 0.70 0.27 0.68 0.65
79 0.67 0.76 0.35 0.69 0.71
80 0.72 0.77 0.69 0.69 0.78
81 0.77 0.79 0.88 0.76 0.81
82 0.78 0.83 0.92 0.78 0.85
83 0.78 0.83 0.92 0.76 0.86
84 0.80 0.84 1.00 0.79 0.86
Table 6









76 0.45 0.41 0.48 0.37 0.46 0.32
77 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.53 0.61 0.50
78 0.67 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.58
79 0.71 0.65 0.71 0.67 0.72 0.54
80 0.77 0.67 0.78 0.66 0.77 0.56
81 0.81 0.72 0.83 0.70 0.82 0.58
82 0.84 0.74 0.86 0.74 0.84 0.66
83 0.84 0.74 0.86 0.73 0.85 0.64
84 0.85 0.77 0.87 0.75 0.86 0.64
Table 7









76 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.04
77 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.33 0.17 0.24
78 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.23 0.13 0.10
79 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.14 0.12
80 0.13 0.19 0.10 0.25 0.13 0.26
81 0.14 0.21 0.07 0.34 0.13 0.32
82 0.09 0.18 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.10
83 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.12
84 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.02xxxiv
Table 8
drlEstimates of Selection Corrected Earnings Equations
 a
                               Work Crime
Variable Hours Wage Hours Wage
CONSTANT 1054.5 0.5936 -277.21 0.1849
(17.31) (0.035) (-6.59) (0.228)












































a Figures in parentheses are t-ratios.xxxv
Table 9
Estimated Average Hourly Wage in Crime and Work*
rdrt Criminal Non Criminal
Year Crime Work Crime Work
77 3.74 4.59 3.95 4.63
78 3.63 4.95 3.39 5.03
79 3.24 5.52 3.65 5.59
80 3.79 6.29 4.66 6.37
81 4.12 6.91 4.74 7.03
* Criminals are considered to be all individuals who were arrested at least
   once during the period 1976-1984.
Table 10
Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors For  the Translog Utility Function
Variable Co-efficient Standard
Error
lnXt  0.2256 0.00053
lnl t  0.2061 0.31388
(lnXt)
2  0.0007 0.000041
(lnl t )
2  0.1084 0.036354
(lnSt)
2  0.1910 0.054218
lnXtlnl t -0.0220 0.000764
lnXt lnSt -0.0077 0.001432
lnStlnl t -0.2141 0.028430
Table 11
Marginal Utility of Consumption, Leisure and Social Capital*





















*(evaluated at sample averages)
Table 12
Responsiveness of Utility to a 1% Increase in  Consumption, Leisure and Social Capital*





















*(evaluated at each data point and averaged over individuals)xxxvi
Table 13








19 36 0.33 0.08
20 26 0.46 0.04
21 29 0.45 0.10
22 20 0.40 0.10
23 23 0.57 0.09
Figure 1.
The Marginal Utility of Social Capital Versus the Age Crime Profile
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Appendix 1
We now derive the Euler equations for the social capital model of crime.  To begin, take first order conditions.
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To obtain the Euler equation for Xt, we invoke the envelope theorem to solve out for the partial derivatives of the
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Evaluating (A.6) at St+1
1 and St+1



































Substituting (A.7) and (A.8) into equation (a.1), we obtain the Euler equation for Xt.
{ } X U t r pU t p U t t: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1
1
1
0 1 1 1 1 0 - + + + - + = b (A.9)
To solve for the partial derivatives of the value function in the remaining first order conditions, we use the



























































To obtain expressions for the partial derivatives of the value function with respect to social capital in each state of
the world, substitute first order condition (A.1) into (A.2) and (A.3) to obtain (A.11) and (A.12) respectively.
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+ +
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Evaluating (A.14) at St+10 and St+11 respectively, we obtain:
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Substitute (A.15) into (3.2) and (A.16) into (A.3) to obtain the Euler equations for time in legitimate income
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Our final set of Euler equations are:
{ } X U t r pU t p U t t: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1
1
1




































































































































0 1 1 0
,
( ) ( )
S
L



























































































































1 1 1 0
,
( ) ( )
S
L
















Time in Income Producing Crime
Income producing crimes are defined to be any crimes that produce income, such as larceny, theft and burglary,
whereas consumption crimes are defined to be crimes which produce no income, such as rape, drunk driving and
hiring a prostitute.  By using both official and self-report records, we create annual observations on time
(representing resources) in income crime for each member of our sample.  The construction of this variable is
broken into two steps.  In the first step, we create the total number of crimes for each person for each time period.
This total is the maximum of total number of self reports and the total number of arrests.  The second step is to
aggregate the different types of crimes, which is done by scoring each crime on the basis of the Sellin-Wolfgang
serousness scoring index.
In the first stage, we create annual observations on the number of crimes for each member of the sample.
This process is complicated by the fact that the self report data are in age categories (19-24).  We create annual
observations from the self report data by 'distributing' the self-reported crimes across the 6 years spanned by the
age category 19 to 24.  This requires assumptions about both participation and frequency of offending during this
time period.  Figlio's (1994) analysis of the self-report for males in the follow-up survey found that the percentage
of individuals committing offenses was constant between the 19-24 and 25+ age groups when all offense types
were considered.  On this basis, we make the assumption that there is a constant participation in crime during the
years 1977-1982.  If the participation rate is constant, then the age-crime profile (total number of
arrests/population) for this cohort should reflect the intensity (or frequency) with which participants commit
crimes.  The self-report data are grouped to obtain offenses corresponding to different income producing crimes.
Official arrest records for the males in the cohort are similarly classified and the requisite weights generated from
aggregate age-crime profiles for each crime category.  The weights are then used to distribute the self reported
crimes across the six year period. This is done using the weights derived from the aggregate age-crime profile for
the period 1977-1982.
Having obtained a measure of the number of crimes committed in a year, we convert the quantity of
crimes into time in crime.  This requires a basis for comparison and aggregation across the different crime types.
Wolfgang and Sellin (1964) propose a seriousness scoring scale which uses the effects of the crimes rather than
specific legal labels to index the gravity of criminal behavior. We use the index of severity serves as a metric for
comparison and aggregation of different crimes. To score a crime, detailed information is required (see Appendix
3, on the seriousness scoring system).  This data was collected from the rap sheets on arrests and seriousness
scores calculated.  However, the information is unknown for crimes for which no arrests take place.  In this case,
seriousness scores must be generated.  We do this by taking random draws from the distribution of seriousness
scores for arrests in the corresponding crime category.  Similarly, there are no self-report data on income from
crime.  Consequently, these data must be generated by taking random draws from the distribution of income from
crime that was obtained from rap sheet data.  Annual observations on time in income generating crime are
obtained by aggregating seriousness scores within a year.  Inspection of the resulting seriousness scores revealed a
range for total crime (consumption plus income) an order of magnitude smaller than the number of hours spent at
work in a year.  We therefore convert seriousness scores to hours by scaling up by a factor of ten.
Time in Legitimate Income Producing Activities and Legitimate Income
The follow-up survey contains detailed information on employment histories for the individuals in the study.  In
particular, for each job (whose tenure was at least six moths), the month and year the individual began and
finnished the job was recorded, along with wage income when the individual began and ended employment,
whether the job was part time or full time, the pay period (hourly, weekly, monthly, or yearly), and the average
hours worked per week.  This information was used to construct annual observations on the number of hours
worked per year and annual labor income from legitimate labor market activities.xliii
APPENDIX 3
THE SELLIN-WOLFGANG SERIOUSNESS SCORING SCALE
In order that we may analyze crime, and not have to worry about aggregating different offenses, the Sellin
Wolfgang seriousness scoring scale is used.  The appeal of this approach is that it uses the effects of the crimes
rather than the specific legal labels attached to them to index the severity or gravity of criminal behavior.  The
seriousness scores of offense gravity consists of three parts.  The first part is constructed utilizing events which
involve violations of the criminal law that inflict bodily harm on one or more victims and/or cause property loss
by theft or damage or destruction.  In order to score criminal events for this part of the scale, the following rap-
sheet information included in the adult offense file was used:
1 The number of victims who, during the event receive minor bodily injuries, or are treated and discharged,
hospitalized, or killed.
2. The number of victims of acts of forcible sexual intercourse.
3. The presence of physical or verbal  intimidation or intimidation by a dangerous weapon.
4. The number of premises forcibly entered.
5. The number of motor vehicles stolen and whether the vehicle was or was not recovered.
The following table lists the seriousness scoring components and the weights devised by Wolfgang and Sellin used
for the first part of the seriousness score.  The score for an event is computed as follows.  The weights are
multiplied by the number of victims who were affected by the various scores and summed.
Table A3.1
Seriousness Scoring Components and Weights
Component Weight
1. Physical injury
    a. minor harm 1.5
    b. treated and discharged 8.5
    c. hospitalization 12.0
    d. fatal 35.7
2. Forcible sex acts 26.0
3. Intimidation
    a. verbal or physical 4.9
    b. by weapon 5.6
4. Premises forcibly entered 1.5
5. Motor Vehicles stolen
    a. recovered 4.5
    b. unrecovered 8.1
The adult offense file also has a second and third part to the seriousness score, which focuses on the seriousness
of crimes that have no 'victims', nor involve theft or property damage.  The final seriousness score used in the
following analysis is the aggregate of the three parts.xliv
                                               
* The authors would like to thank participants in seminars and lectures at Texas A&M University, Rice
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in 
i This model has generated an extensive and influential literature on deterrence.  For good reviews of this
literature, see Heineke, 1978; Schmidt and Witte, 1984; Eide, 1994.
ii For a survey of these generic models in the context of dynamic structural models of health, see Sickles and
Taubman (1997) and Behrman et al. (1998).
iii Our formulation is also consistent with the interpretation that 'standards by which individuals gauge their well
being are molded by their prior experiences' (Johnson and Pencavel, 1984).
iv The concept of social capital was introduced into the sociology literature by Coleman (1988).  It measures the
bondedness of an individual to society.  Social capital consists of three components: networks for disseminating
and obtaining information (e.g. about job opportunities), a reward and punishment system, and a system of
reciprocal debts and obligations (Coleman, 1988).  Laub and Sampson (1993) link social capital with informal
social.  According to social control theory, it is the bonds an individual has to conventional social groups that
generate the potential cost of social sanctions, and this in turn restrains misbehavior.  Informal social control
theory emphasizes the influence of institutional relationships such as family, work, and community on the
likelihood of deviance.  The recent survey by Miller (1997, p. 1178) also discusses the interplay of social
networks on the rational voter paradigm utilized in public choice.
v Tauchen, Witte, and Greisinger (1988) and Witte and Tauchen (1994) find evidence of these effects in the
decision to participate in crime.
vi Crime is distinguished from employment since net income from crime has a state contingent component.  If an
individual is successful in escaping apprehension, he reaps the entire value (pecuniary and monetary equivalent of
nonpecuniary income) of his illegitimate activity.  If apprehended, his income will be reduced by a fine, which is
the monetary equivalent of the punishment meted out.
vii Alternately, social capital theory suggests that individuals with a larger social capital stock (either inherited or
accumulated in adulthood) face a higher expected cost of deviant behavior that reduces the probability of crime.
Since employment is an important institution for building social capital, employed individuals are less likely to
commit crime.  With the collapse of the labor market for less skilled workers over the past two decades,
individuals with greater human capital stock are more likely to obtain jobs (build social capital) and not commit
crime (Akerlof, 1998).
viii  See, for example, the studies by Sickles, Schimdt, and Witte (1979), Witte (1980), Long and Witte (1981),
Thornberry and Fanworth  (1982), Freeman (1983,1991),  Schmidt and Witte (1984), Good, Pirog-Good, and
Sickles (1986), Tauchen, Witte, and Griesinger (1988), Witte and Tauchen (1994), Grogger (1995).
ix  An empirical literature supports informal control theory, finding evidence of deterrent effects of moral and
social sanctions on deviant behavior.  See Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990.
x A more general specification would allow both human and social capital stocks to influence welfare directly in
the structural model.  While relaxing this assumption poses no problem for the mathematical model, it does cause
complications for the empirical model as we are no longer able to obtain closed form solutions for the Euler
equations.  An approach to deal with this is to utilize asymptotic expansions to approximate the value function.
In concert with the highly nonlinear Euler equations system and the need to simulate unobserved states of
apprehension/escape from apprehension, the additional computational burden of value function approximation is
rather daunting.  In this paper we concentrate on the social capital accumulation process in developing our
theoretical structural dynamic model of crime while incorporating human capital indirectly into the empirical
model.
xi  Empirical evidence regarding the use of informal social resources in achieving occupational mobility in the
United States and, to a lesser extent, in West Germany and the Netherlands is found in Li (1988) and DeGraaf
and Flap(1988).xlv
                                                                                                                                                                
xii  The probability of apprehension is treated as exogenous and constant in this model.  Relaxing this assumption
poses no problem for the mathematical model.  However, it introduces complications for estimation since we no
longer are able to obtain closed form solutions for the Euler equations.
xiii  In earlier versions of this paper, both pure income and pure utility generating crimes were included in the
model, where utility generating crime included rape and murder.  However, the data did not contain sufficient
information to identify the effect of utility generating crimes.  Hence, we have simplified the model by only
considering income generating crimes.
xiv  We justify our use of a time allocation model of crime on the basis that realization of criminal acts depends
upon criminal opportunity.  For example, individuals who are employed and married are typically subject to more
structured routine activities and have less free time than unemployed single men.  This restricts their criminal
opportunities and thus the probability of criminal actions.
xv In our empirical model, labor market earnings also depend on human capital as measured by educational
attainment.
xvi Freeman (1996) provides evidence from the NLSY that human capital variables play a more important role in
the legitimate job market than in crime.  Specifically, he regressed the share of income from illegal sources on















































xviii  In reality, there may be many sources of uncertainty in the returns to crime, such as varying degrees of self-
protection by potential victims.
xix  Labor market experience increases an individual’s stock of institutional knowledge, and networks, which we
consider to contribute to social capital, but could also be interpreted as human capital.  For the purpose of the
theoretical model, we consider social capital to encompass human capital.  This interpretation becomes
problematic in the event that a social sanction imposed, if human capital is wholly embodied within the individual,
and therefore not subject to such sanctions.  We attempt to distinguish between strictly human capital, such as
educational attainment, and that acquired from labor market experience, which we interpret as social capital in
our empirical model.
xx  The derivation of the Euler equations is given in Appendix 1.
xxi Rap sheet and police investigation reports provided by the Juvenile Aid Division of the Philadelphia Police
Department were used to characterize all police encounters experienced by the cohort before age eighteen.
xxii The adult criminal justice data come from the Municipal and Common Pleas Courts of Philadelphia
xxiii  This term refers to an individual’s criminal history.
xxiv Stratification is by gender, race, socioeconomic status, and number of juvenile offenses.
xxv Codes linking follow-up survey data and juvenile and adult arrest files for women are incomplete
xxvi  Although telescoping, lack of recall, and candor are all possible in retrospective studies of this type, Figlio
(1994) finds no evidence of uniform telescoping bias.
ght 
xxvii This compares with the cohort (the universe of individuals born in 1958 who lived in Philadelphia from
their tenth and eighteenth birthday) which contained 47% white males.
xxviii These statistics are based on the full adult arrest data, which covers the period ending 31 Dec, 1984.
xxix The importance of family has clearly not gone unnoticed in economics.  Becker (1991) notes that the fortunes
of children are linked to their parents through endowments, such as family reputation and connections, knowledge,
skills, and goals provided by the family environment
xxx These weights are sample specific.  As an alternative, Maasoumi (1986,1990) suggests that the weights given
to the attributes may be the researcher’s subjective weights.
xxxi Factor analysis is an alternative means to obtain weights.  Kim and Mueller (1978) note that principal
components has an advantage over factor analysis if the objective is a simple summary of information contained
in the raw data, since the method of principal components does not require the strong assumptions underlying
factor analysis.
xxxii  Assuming, of course, that individuals are on the upward sloping portion of their labor supply curve.
xxxiii We control for human capital through educational attainment.  While experience is also included in standardxlvi
                                                                                                                                                                
earnings equations, reduced form work using this data finds neither experience or experience squared to be
significant in explaining legitimate earnings (Williams and Sickles, 1998).  On the basis of this finding and given
the extra complexity imposed by including human capital accumulation in the model, we rely on education to
measure human capital.
xxxiv These functional forms satisfy the conditions for the earnings equations given in footnote #18.
xxxv See footnotes 10,20.
xxxvi   Ehrlich’s (1973) time allocation model of crime predicts that a relative increase in legal wages will reduce
the incentive to participate in illegal activity.
xxxvii  Witte, 1980; Thornberry and Fanworth , 1982; Tauchen, Witte, and Griesinger ,1988; Witte and Tauchen,
1994; Grogger, 1995; Schmidt and Witte, 1984; Long and Witte, 1981; Freeman 1983,1991.
xxxviii  This represents an average for those working.
xxxix We take the estimated earnings equation parameters to be the true values, and the parameters governing the
law of motion for social capital accumulation to be those obtained using principal components.  This is discussed
in depth in the next section.  Sample data is used to calibrate the probability of arrest at 0.06.  We assume a real
rate of interest of 3%, and a time rate of preference of 0.95.  Substituting these parameters, the derivatives of the
income functions and the translog utility functions into the Euler equations from Section 2 results in the
representative individual’s per period optimal choice of time allocations (Lt, Ct) and consumption (Xt)
parameterized by  ( ) q a a a b b b b b b 0 1 2 3 11 22 33 12 13 23 = , , , , , , , ,
xl   The choice of weighting matrix that produces the efficient or optimal GMM estimator is W0
1 =
- W , where Wis
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xli Sufficient conditions for the MSM estimator to be consistent and asymptotically normal involve the same
regularity assumptions and conditions on instruments as classical GMM, in addition to the two following
assumptions that concern the simulator, m(.): (i)  the simulation bias, conditional on W0 and xit, is zero, and  (ii)
the simulation residual process is uniformly stochastically bounded and equicontinuous in q .
xlii Recall that St+1  depends on last periods choices, and whether or not the individual is apprehended in period
t+1.  So we are able to construct future social capital stock in period t+1 in the unobserved state.
xliii  Other studies, however, find evidence that these goods are substitutes (Altonji ,1986; Ghez and Becker,
(1975) ; Thurow, (1969)).
xliv These are obtained by evaluating at sample averaged (across individuals) data.
xlv This number is calculated by multiplying the marginal rate of substitution by the CPI, where the CPI is
averaged over 1977 to 1981.
xlvi See Ryder  and Heal ( 1973 ) and Becker and Murphy (1988).
xlvii We investigate the ability of this measure to predict the probability of an individual participating in crime in
Williams and Sickles, 1997b.
xlviii  The translog frees up constraints on additivity and homotheticity, which makes it better behaved in terms of
global curvature properties than more restrictive functional forms.  However, this flexibility often compromises
the regularity of the estimated curvatures outside the region in which the data and estimates are centered.  This
problem has been well documented in the literature of flexible functional forms (Guilkey, et al., 1983; Pollak, et
al., 1984; Barnett, 1985: Diewert and Wales, 1987).